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The concept of a ‘case’ differs between law and other fields in which the term is used, 
including literature. So establishing what a case is, in interdisciplinary studies of law and 
literature, is an important step in identifying what is distinctive about such work. It is also 
important to establish what is involved in ‘interpreting’ a case, since each of the fields 
contributing to this interdisciplinary endeavour follows its own, distinctive approaches. 
Historically, the study of law and literature has been shaped by a series of approaches to 
interpretation which have served to define the field’s purposes and significance.  
 
An influential example of interaction between interpretive approach and the value 
associated with studying law and literature provides my starting point for this chapter. As 
far back as his Preface to the second edition of Law and Literature (in the late 1990s), 
Richard Posner observed that ‘literary’ approaches to interpretation of legal discourse had 
‘diminished in the face of a growing sense that interpretation is relative to purpose and 
therefore unlikely to raise the same issues for different interpretanda (dreams, operas, 
labels, constitutions, sonnets)’.1 Later in the same volume, Posner observed that the 
decline of interest in ‘literary’ approaches to interpretation he was reporting also reflected 
considerations of method. Specifically, he argued, interpretation is ‘not much, and maybe 
not at all, improved by being made self-conscious, just as one doesn’t become a better 
reader by studying linguistics’.2 In this chapter, I ask how far Posner's scepticism about 
the value of ‘literary’ styles of interpretation applied to legal discourse (as well as his 
reservation about the usefulness of linguistic self-consciousness in reading) holds for 
cases in common law traditions, which differ in important respects from the statutes and 
constitutions on which Posner based his original argument.  
 
My discussion
3
 has two stages. To begin, I look at the general concept of a ‘case’, 
questioning how far the notion is coherent if extended beyond legal cases to literary 
topics and to literary works with legal themes. I suggest that invoking an undifferentiated 
sense of ‘case’ in interdisciplinary enquiry opens up interpretive possibilities but risks 
vagueness and ambiguity. In the second half of the chapter, I focus on ‘case reports’ in 
law: the genre of publication usually known as ‘law reports’. Such reports offer the most 
precisely defined legal representation of cases; they also often attract expansive comment 
as well as legal exegesis, including along lines influenced by literary studies. I explore 
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how far genre considerations associated with law reports constrain the interpretive 
approaches that can be usefully brought to bear on them, as Posner argued was the case 
for statutes and constitutions. In partial agreement with Posner, I conclude that close links 
between the formal characteristics and purposes of law reports do place obstacles in the 
way of alternative readings. But I suggest that those obstacles need not undermine an 
extended sense of interpretation which can result in illuminating critical readings. My 
agreement with Posner's argument is only partial, however. Against his further claim that 
reflexiveness in interpretation is generally unhelpful, I argue that even highly insightful 
literary readings of particular legal cases are less important than increased self-
consciousness as regards how meanings are created by interpretive practices that differ in 
important ways, as well as overlap, between the two fields. 
 
Different kinds of ‘case’ 
 
There is little risk of someone who is following an academic course in law and literature 
becoming confused by what is meant by a ‘case’ in different edited collections they are 
directed to read. If you open a literary-critical ‘casebook’ (such as R.P.Draper’s, Thomas 
Hardy: the Tragic Novels (Casebook), or Peter Widdowson’s ‘new casebook’ Tess of the 
D’Urbervilles4), you will find a selection of essays introducing the reader to critical 
approaches to the text or texts in question. The general purpose of such volumes is clear. 
In the General Editor’s Preface to the Casebook series, launched in 1968, A.E.Dyson 
explained that each ‘single author’ casebook would present critical readings of a well-
known work, or cluster of closely related works, along with contemporaneous reviews 
and comment. In the General Editors’ Preface to the ‘New Casebook’ series, John Peck 
and Martin Coyle widened that aim to reflect a shift in literary studies: the new volumes, 
they wrote, would also reveal how contemporary criticism has ‘changed our 
understanding of commonly studied texts and writers, as well as of the nature of criticism 
itself’.5  
 
In striking contrast, in a legal textbook of cases and materials (such as William Cornish’s, 
Cases and Materials in Intellectual Property or Eric Barendt and Linda Hitchens’s, 
Media Law: Cases and Materials
6
), the reader is presented not only with a very different 
selection but with sources that serve a contrasting purpose. Such case collections in law 
are designed to bring together ‘legislative texts and extracts from cases which form the 
basis of United Kingdom law’7. In Barendt and Hitchens, the focus is on ‘the range of 
topics comprising media law’8; in Cornish, on the ‘various aspects of intellectual property 
rights proper and those topics, such as liability for breach of confidence and passing off, 
which form adjuncts’.9 Such texts provide either a combination of ‘key materials with 
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critical commentary’, as in Barendt and Hitchens,10 or, as in the Cornish volume, are 
‘intended to be used together with texts that give an account of the law as a corpus …. 
[the book] does not therefore have its own commentary’.11  
 
Both kinds of volume - legal and literary - offer useful collections of ‘case’ material.  But 
they deploy the idea of a ‘case’ differently. The contrast I have drawn between them is 
significant because the same word ‘case’ can be used of either type of publication. It is 
therefore worth examining what the word ‘case’ denotes, then relating the word’s varying 
meanings to wider understandings of ‘case’ at work in law and literature scholarship.  
 
Even confining ourselves to common dictionary definitions, we find a range of senses. 
We may immediately rule out, as not relevant, the idea of case as grammatical category, 
formally marked by inflection. We might also take the view that the meaning ‘container, 
receptacle or box’ (which gives rise to upper-case and lower-case keyboard characters) is 
simply figurative in marking edges or boundaries, and again irrelevant. But there are 
other meanings which complicate what a ‘case’ is for the purpose of interdisciplinary 
work in law and literature. 
 
We may pause, for example, over ‘a particular situation or instance, especially one that 
you are using as an example of something more general’. Based on evidence from the 
Cobuild dictionary project,
12
 this is the most common contemporary sense of ‘case’. 
When we talk about ‘the case of literature’, we mean matters pertaining to literature as an 
instance of some more general phenomenon, in contrast with other cases (such as ‘the 
case of physics’). Those other cases are viewed as being different while also being 
members of the same larger class (in this case, that of objects of study).  
 
This combined sense of particulars treated in terms of their membership of a 
superordinate class has ramifications both in law and in literature. A legal ‘case’, for 
example, is a highly detailed social and discursive event: it encapsulates an episode of 
what might loosely be called real-life drama; and its events are important lived 
experiences for the parties, sometimes deeply damaging or even tragic, which are 
selectively framed as a distinct entity for legal analysis and judgment.
13
 At the same time, 
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each legal case is an instance of a more abstract, general category: a copyright case, 
negligence case, murder case, fraud case, etc. In relation to this superordinate 
classification, the facts of the particular case are exactly subordinate: the case is 
remembered in legal circles, if at all, as dealing with a legal crux of some kind, and the 
question at law has the effect of displacing the persons and their actions, despite the case 
being permanently labelled with their names as the parties.
14
 When juxtaposed with the 
first idea of ‘case’, this second, abstract notion suggests a different act of framing: a 
‘case’ is less a specific situation that needs to be settled than a springboard offered by a 
set of particulars into generalisations which set out a legal principle. 
15
 
  
The ‘instance and category’ meaning is also applied beyond law. A literary ‘case’ 
depends similarly on a combination of particulars and overarching, discipline-specific 
categories. The particulars include details of production, such as a writer’s source 
materials, chosen themes, and habits of composition. There are also the different kinds of 
agency involved in the preparation, publication and circulation of a literary work, 
including the work of editors who amend passages and guide publication, reviewers and 
critics who advance alternative views, and literature teachers and students who argue 
over techniques and significance. In addition there are institutional settings: publishing 
houses, college seminar rooms, and reading groups. There are also equivalent abstract, 
disciplinary categories that a literary ‘case’ may exemplify. These include works by the 
particular author, work in a given genre, and work treating some recognised critical or 
historical theme or problem. Something similar also occurs beyond literature. Cases are 
treated as both specific instances and exemplars of a general category in professional 
fields variously concerned with disease, injury and hardship. The word ‘case’ is used of 
people attended by a doctor, for example, or who are in treatment with a psychoanalyst, 
or who become clients of a solicitor or financial advisor. In each of these professional 
fields of cases, casework, caseloads and case workers, the combination of ‘particulars 
plus treatment on the basis of membership of a disciplinary category’ is the clearly active 
meaning of ‘case’. What can nevertheless complicate the interdisciplinary study of 
‘cases’ is that the general formula may be applied in ways that impose too strong a 
likeness on analogous instances of particulars and categories. Insufficient attention to 
differences in this regard blurs the distinction between principles of selection of an 
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instance, and mixes models of what will qualify any given instance as a member of the 
relevant category. 
 
A further shading of meaning of ‘case’ highlights special complexity when the ‘instance 
and category’ model is applied to verbal discussion. In such circumstances, ‘case’ can 
mean not only a topic of discussion, as with ‘the case of electoral reform’ (contrast: ‘the 
case of education reform’), but rather some argument or evidence supporting a particular 
position within such discussion (cf. ‘the case for electoral reform’). This meaning has 
considerable scope. It extends to the view of a literary work as an object of competing 
literary critical appreciations (e.g. ‘the case for seeing Tess as heroine rather than 
victim’). A literary case, then, may be not just a case study or test case, but a ‘topic’ case 
about which ‘argument’ cases are put forward from different critical positions.  
 
What is significant about such polysemy (which if over-emphasised can begin to feel like 
a semantic game) is mostly not the prospect of local misunderstanding. Rather, it is that, 
when a notion such as ‘case’ is used in a new field or in interdisciplinary work between 
established fields, it is uncertain, without clarification, how a given ‘case’ should be 
investigated or exactly why a particular case deserves attention.  
 
What sense or senses of ‘case’, we should therefore ask, are in play in interdisciplinary 
work on law and literature? Clearly the ‘court proceedings’ sense occurs frequently (used 
either of actual legal cases or applied to depictions of trials in fiction or drama, such as 
the scarcely narrated murder case in which the character Tess is the defendant). The 
‘argument’ sense is also relevant (e.g. the defence case implicit in Tess's circumstances at 
the moment she kills Alex, the formulation or rebuttal of which oddly features hardly at 
all in the novel). The ‘instance and category’ sense will also be found (e.g. ‘in the case of 
Tess but not of Hardy's other protagonists in his ‘Novels of Character and Environment’); 
and there will be the broad ‘framed narrative’ sense (as in ‘the case of Tess seems unique 
in nineteenth-century fiction’). This last meaning is challengingly wide, however. It 
evokes an only vaguely indicated category: possibly something related to actual events 
which took place during the controversy surrounding the novel’s publication, or 
alternatively some unspecified, more general social phenomenon, or alternatively again 
some compound of fictional characteristics of the character Tess with an unspecified mix 
of social and historical conditions in nineteenth-century England and Hardy's known 
imaginative interests.
16
  
 
We should take stock at this point. I am suggesting that contrasts between different kinds 
of ‘case’ collection reveal potentially important differences between legal and literary 
uses of the idea of a ‘case’. Each contrast problematizes the issue of what should be 
studied in this field, and how any given ‘case’, as an object of study, should be treated.  
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1. There is a contrast of subject matter and treatment.  
 
Even where a selected literary ‘case’ (a novel, play, author’s work) directly represents a 
legal situation or trial, the treatment of legal material is different. This difference points 
to a deeper contrast: that between something being a court case or part of a court case (a 
rule-governed discursive event), and something being a representation of a court case in 
a different discursive form (whether drama, novel, or law report).  
 
2. In literary analysis there is typically one ‘case’: a selected novel, play, collection of 
poems, or author.  
 
A literary ‘casebook’ anthology is a collection of commentaries on a work or author, 
published because its, his or her significance is considered worthy of commentary and 
further investigation. The selected excerpts are interpretations converging on that single 
case, which is set apart from the commentaries on it not least by the fact that the work is 
in a conventionally literary genre while the essays commenting on it take a literary 
critical form. The legal analogy is less that of a volume of case materials than an 
extended treatment of a single set of proceedings consisting of further documentary 
evidence and submissions.  
 
3. While both law report and literary work deploy exposition and narrative in their 
representation of a case, there are differences as regards the claims being made.  
 
The literary ‘case’ consists of narrated events that are mostly imagined or fictional (and 
which have their own complex origins in the author’s experience or subjective 
formation). Where material draws on an actual legal case, it does so by means of 
imaginative condensation, projection or exaggeration. In legal cases, on the other hand, a 
great deal of effort is made by judges to set out the facts to which they then apply the law. 
Reports of legal cases abbreviate the statement of such facts and the evidence that led to 
particular findings of fact. But this type of condensation serves to limit reports to legally 
relevant material; it does not alter the truth-claims made with respect to factual material.  
 
4. Interpretation differs as regards how moves are made from evidence to significance.  
 
The facts which guide interpretation of a literary case include patterns observed in a 
text’s language; external circumstances of authorship and creative intentions; and details 
of publication and reception. Interpretation of the text would almost certainly differ if 
techniques of legal construction rather than ordinary language comprehension were 
followed in reading its language. Doctrines of legal construction offer normative 
guidance in the interpretation of legal language (e.g. by interpreting ambiguity in favour 
of the defendant or against the meaning claimed by the party drafting a contract). Literary 
interpretation, by contrast, combines general intuitions regarding discourse meaning with 
awareness of specialised stylistic techniques adopted in literary works.
17
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5.  The underlying ‘problem’ being addressed differs between the two fields, with no 
shared standard of what constitutes satisfactory resolution of the problem that a case is 
thought to illustrate. 
 
In law, concern is mainly with how the law stands in a particular area, and how the law in 
that area (as it stands) applies to particular findings of fact. Settlement of a dispute in a 
civil action, or the outcome of a criminal trial, is sought through legal reasoning applied 
to findings of fact, drawing on authorities that take the form of decisions made in 
relevant, earlier cases. There is therefore directionality in any sequence of cited cases 
which is more than chronological: a directionality that explains why the facts of any 
given case, once that action is concluded, are less important than the legal reasoning 
applied to them (since it is the reasoning which can establish a legal rule that is then 
carried forward).
18
 Literary cases also present a cumulative record of argument and 
insight. But ‘rules’ governing moves in a literary critical debate are less constrained as 
regards direction. Often, the more ‘well read’ or ‘cultivated’ a literary discussion, the 
more references will be triggered outwards, into an array of literary works and critical 
stances that the topic engages. 
 
6. Cases differ between the two fields as regards how they are read.  
 
Literature students typically read only one case per ‘casebook’, albeit against a 
background of extensive reading and with a view to analysing alternative cases (in the 
argument sense of ‘case’) submitted in relation to it. Their law counterparts read many 
cases in their collection. For the law student, the greater number of prescribed cases 
follows from the principle that each case illustrates legal submissions which informed the 
decision arrived at by the court. In this way, each case both presents a legal problem and 
sets out a legally reasoned solution to that problem in the form of judgment and verdict. 
Each case also refers to earlier cases which may themselves be read (in extract form) in 
the same edited volume. Together, the various cases form the series of steps carrying 
forward a developing legal argument which builds towards a statement of what the law 
now is.  
 
7. While in each kind of case accumulated interpretations and judgments form traditions, 
the nature and significance of those traditions differ.  
 
Literary-critical opinions form a tradition in the sense of a succession of arguments. They 
combine individual inventiveness and communal critical belief in a variable mix, and 
respond to changing artistic and social conditions. In literary critical history (as more 
visibly in the history of modern art), such traditions show uneven development, and 
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follow unpredictable patterns of influence, adaptation, subversion, critique and rejection 
of schools and positions. This is so both in creative work and in commentary on such 
work. It requires general artistic conservatism (e.g. some form of Classicism), or a more 
specific, idealist construct of the sort put forward by T.S.Eliot in his essay ‘Tradition and 
the Individual Talent ' (1919),
19
 to see literary tradition as development of cultural 
wisdom leading to a normative standard. The legal volume, by contrast, presents its series 
of cases not because they constitute a tradition in this loose sense of influence, but 
because, together, cases represent ‘case law’: an accumulating body of adjudications 
which fill in and clarify statute law, and as we see below may become precedents that 
bind later judgments within an overall common law system. 
 
‘Reporting’ cases 
 
The contrasts I have listed highlight (some would say unfairly accentuate) a number of 
differences within the broad class of ‘cases’ that are of interest in law and literature. In 
setting out the distinctions, I have nevertheless stayed away from a persistent, underlying 
issue: that of the mode of representation of such ‘cases’. When we read a case, what 
exactly is it we are reading? Different ways that ‘case material’ is presented in published 
form are not mere stylistic alternatives; they stand in different relation to a fundamental 
problem in all representation, the problem of claims to truth (or to some other standard of 
meaningfulness).  
 
What, for example, distinguishes ‘reporting’ a case from ‘depicting’, ‘narrating’, or 
‘representing’ one? And how important is the difference between those alternatives? In 
(and surrounding) any trial, there is a cascade of different kinds of ‘legal discourse’: from 
formally sanctioned statutes, indictments, pleadings and oaths; through courtroom cross-
examination, witness statements, and sometimes confession; into various kinds of news 
story, feature, dramatic and fictional account, and more definitive (but still varying) 
forms of published law report. Each of these ‘case’ genres may exhibit – indeed is likely 
to exhibit - a different epistemological commitment. It is therefore important to engage 
with questions of storytelling and authority in the representation of cases, and to consider 
what constitutes a ‘report’. Within the general concept of reporting identified, it is then 
important to clarify how the most authoritative vehicle of legal narrative and exposition, 
the law report, guides case interpretation. 
 
Consider the general notion of a ‘report’ first. The varying kinds of meaning potential 
outlined above in relation to ‘case’ are echoed, if not amplified, when we take into 
account the written forms in which cases circulate.  
 
The word ‘report’, as either noun or verb, has a cluster of meanings. We may 
immediately filter out ‘statement of progress at school’ (‘school report’); and we are also 
likely to exclude ‘job reference’. More relevantly, though, there is the meaning of a 
‘statement widely made or known’, or alternatively a statement ‘communicated privately 
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to a particular addressee’. More significant again is the meaning of an ‘account prepared 
for the benefit of others’, especially an account that provides information obtained 
through investigation, such as the ‘deliberations of a committee or other body’. ‘Report’ 
across these senses has as a core meaning not only that such accounts serve an 
information-giving purpose but that they aspire to being definitive: a report offers some 
kind of update, synthesis, or indication of outcome. 
 
Scope for variation in the reporting of legal cases is nevertheless considerable, at least in 
principle. Representations of a case tell a story of that case: they record it, depict it, 
describe it or narrate it. In doing so, they frame an open-ended human or social 
experience that could be seen from some more than one point of view. The legal case is 
given its particular shape not only by imposition of a beginning and an ending, but by the 
structuring of the intervening narrative in such a way that special attention is given to 
sequence of events, causation, and responsibility or liability. Point of view is provided by 
a secondary level of framing, imposed by the shift that takes place from specific actions 
and events to generic classes of action and event, and from particulars to abstract legal 
categories and rules.
20
 In these respects, law reporting, unlike other kinds of storytelling 
about law, make a stronger claim than that of merely collecting and telling good stories 
about real people (like a documentary), or of narrating the facts of a case and recording 
the decision made on those facts by the court. A further claim is implied: that the reported 
decision emerges from and illustrates due process. Law reports are in this respect a 
canonical instance of the factivity and closure that underpin notions of reporting. In a 
manner that parallels scientific reporting, they follow procedures aimed at controlling the 
truth-status of information they present: the evidence they record was tested in court; and 
statements of points of law are governed by doctrines of construction promulgated to 
guide legal interpretation.
21
 Law reporting extends the rigour of the court by carrying 
over the court’s social and epistemological authority into the structure and style of the 
report on the page.
22
 Collectively, these features are what make a law report a report. 
 
It sounds odd, by comparison, to ask the question ‘Is this a ‘report’?’ of most literary 
works. Daniel Defoe’s Journal of the Plague Year (1722) might be felt to be a report in a 
sense related to journalistic reporting, or reportage. A ‘state of the nation’ novel, or 
political satire, might be viewed as at least figuratively a ‘report’ on the events or social 
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climate of a given society. But most literary works, including those with legal themes, 
seem unsuited to the term. Nor is description of literary critical writing as ‘reporting’ any 
more intuitive. Terms with less epistemological loading seem preferable, such as review, 
response, appreciation, or assessment (‘analysis’ may be closest in meaning to ‘report’ in 
a literary context).  
 
Law reports 
 
How law reports written along the lines indicated above are interpreted, and how they 
might be reinterpreted in ways other than those anticipated in normal legal use, can be 
made clearer by a thumbnail sketch of the genre's history, structure, and functions.
23
  
 
History  
 
In Britain, the earliest court decisions were stored in the minds of judges and court 
officials. But there have been what are recognisably law reports from the thirteenth 
century onwards, growing out of early mediaeval Plea Rolls which recorded basic details 
of litigation and were kept to establish the rights of the parties as well as to assist 
enforcement of decisions. During the period between the late thirteenth and mid-sixteenth 
century, reports take the form of what are now known as the Year Books, hand-written 
first in ‘law French’ and Latin, then later in English.24 The Year Books were initially 
private documents, but were gradually addressed beyond the court and the parties 
involved to a wider public consisting largely of law students who were less interested in 
the details of any particular case than in understanding the reasoning applied in it, since 
this would offer a general picture of the system of law and might also be useful in 
arguing later cases. Law reports from the mid-sixteenth century are now described, 
especially after 1578 (the date of Edmund Plowden's Commentaries), as ‘nominate’ 
reports: commercially published, of variable accuracy, and so-called because they were 
known by the names of their authors (Plowden himself, Sir Edward Coke, later James 
Burrow, and others). The nominate reports adopted a more expansive commentary form, 
elaborating on and interpreting the stages of litigation and decisions handed down. 
Although these reports circulated widely in a rapidly expanding law profession, there was 
still nothing resembling a public system of law reporting. Over time, however, reports 
shifted in emphasis from simply recording judicial decisions to reporting arguments as 
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illustration of legal reasoning, inevitably blurring the distinction between a record of 
particular decisions and a statement of what the law as decreed by judges was. Such 
reports also became more closely linked to another field of publication: that of collections 
of reports for several years at a time, condensed and arranged by subject-matter, and 
known as ‘abridgements’.25 It is only later, during the second half of the eighteenth 
century, that more precise conventions in reporting were actively sought, for instance as 
regards practical arrangements for authorised reporters, agreement on which cases to 
report, and in order to minimise delays in publication.  
 
From the 1860s, the Law Reports series conferred greater authority on published reports 
and incorporated counsels' arguments as well as opinions revised by judges. The second 
half of the nineteenth century also brought other kinds of standardisation: the 
Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales dates from this period, 
followed by Weekly Law Reports, Times reports (with antecedents in the earlier Universal 
Register), then later the All-England Reports. While in principle any report of a judicial 
decision could be cited in court, law reporting gradually became a more specialised 
profession within the Bar; and a procedure of ‘exclusive citation’, under which 
preference was given to authorised reports, was adopted and periodically restated.  
 
Following this nineteenth-century period of reforms, English law reports have largely 
resembled modern reports. Even now, however, in a period of online access to most 
decisions of courts of record (e.g. via  BAILII), less than 5 per cent of English cases are 
reported in an authoritative, published form, with the selection of those cases (out of a 
vast number that inevitably go unreported) based on commercial as well as legal criteria. 
Even Law Reports, the most official reporting channel and so mouthpiece of legal 
authority, covers only about 10 per cent of that ‘less than 5 per cent’ reported overall.  
 
Structure 
 
One important thread in the history of law reporting has been a concern with 
standardising the conventions that govern the structure of reports as documents. The 
internal organisation of reports has been gradually adapted to the conditions in which 
they are used, as well as to the purposes for which they were used in successive periods. 
During the 20th century, reports were increasingly presented in layouts which facilitate 
searching, skimming and citation: clearer sign-posting of the sequence of topics; adoption 
of more restrictive conventions of vocabulary and sentence structure; and more explicit 
signalling of shifts of speech act (for example from narration of facts, through exposition 
of legal arguments, to the handing down of a verdict). 
 
Allowing for some variation in different types of publication, the following list indicates 
how a modern law report sets out its material. 
 
 Names of the parties, court where the case was heard, names of the judges, date 
 Catchwords: compiled by the law reporter 
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 Headnote: summary of the facts of the case, questions of law, decision (in US, 
known as ‘syllabus’) 
 List of cases cited in judgment 
 List of other cases cited in argument 
 Details of the proceedings: short history of the case 
 Résumé of counsels’ arguments 
 Judgment: the facts, legal issues, and outcome (in the highest courts this may 
consist of several opinions, including dissenting opinions) 
 Formal order (i.e. outcome, such as ‘appeal dismissed’) 
 
These largely standardised stages are now effectively conventions of the law reporting 
genre. Each involves a formulaic mode of expression; and collectively the sections 
impose a distinct, overall structure.
26
 The reader’s attention is managed both synoptically, 
as he or she takes an overview of the document by flicking (now scrolling) through, and 
also temporally, as the reader progresses from exposition to opinion to judgment and 
formal order. With such conventions settled, a normative instructional literature has 
developed around the genre: for law reporters, on how to compose a report; for students, 
on how to locate cases and efficiently skim, scan and absorb material that conforms to the 
standardised structure; even for judges’ clerks, on how to draft an opinion suitable for 
reporting.  
 
Function / use 
 
The structure of modern law reports emerged, then, from an iterative historical process of 
innovation, use and review by producers and users. Specific features evolved through 
ergonomic adaptation, in order to facilitate a particular approach to reading based on 
professional requirements.  
 
The guidance that genre features give to reading, however, must be re-activated on each 
occasion of use. Some practical assistance is given with this by design features: citation 
conventions, to signal how to find the right report; layout, to assist with consulting an 
appropriate section in a report while talking at the same time. Other requirements for use 
are less tied to textual features than to aspects of professional behaviour. Core legal 
arguments are extracted from the report by means of a process of inference, for example. 
Two common law procedures that are closely interwoven with the law report form, but 
which are problematic in relation to any idea of the report genre consisting purely of 
textual features, stand out as in need of comment in this context: the role of the ratio 
decidendi in a legal argument; and the claim of a particular case to constitute a precedent 
in relation to a subsequent case.
27
 
                                                 
26
 On what constitutes genre generally, see Douglas Biber and Susan Conrad, Register, Genre, and Style, 
Cambridge: CUP, 2009. 
27
 More detailed discussion of the ratio decidendi in a case and the operation of precedent in UK law, 
linked to analysis of a series of illustrative cases, can be found in Manchester, Salter and Moodie, 
Exploring the Law, see esp. pp.3-58. For an introduction to the relevant history, see Harding, Social History 
of English Law. More theoretical discussion of the interaction between ratio and precedent can be found in 
legal-philosophical essays collected in Laurence Goldstein (ed.), Precedent in Law, Oxford: Clarendon 
 13 
 
The ratio of a case is the point or rule taken to be of legal significance when abstracted 
from the facts of that case. It is the ratio which enables a case to contribute to the series 
of steps which carry forward legal principles from case to case on the basis of the 
common law principle of stare decisis, or ‘decision in accordance with precedent’. The 
ratio cannot, however, be itemised in a list of the sections contained in a report, because 
it is never directly stated: the ratio is not a quotable episode but an inferred construct. It is 
discovered -- or more accurately, worked out -- through a specialised practice of reading. 
Apart from having to be constructed, the ratio must also be distinguished from points 
made by a judge as obiter dicta (things said ‘in passing’). Such obiter dicta comments, 
which may resemble the ratio in making general points but differ from it in status and 
effect, have only ‘persuasive authority’; they do not bind later courts in the way that the 
ratio can. It is the ratio, once determined, that serve as the motor of common law 
precedent. A case submitted as a precedent may be deemed either to be ‘in point’ (and so 
apply), or not to apply, depending on whether the case under consideration is 
‘distinguished’ from it (because what is presented as the ratio of the earlier case does not 
fit sufficiently when transposed to the facts of the case to which the precedent is claimed 
to apply). The inferred ratio and the legal purpose of observing precedent combine with 
the textual form of a law report to create an overall common law system of legal 
proceedings: a system which requires both a hierarchy of courts in which a senior court 
binds lower courts and, completing the reciprocal influence between textual form and 
professional practice, a system of accurate law reporting to ensure that citation of any 
claimed precedent is reliable. 
 
Reading cases: the role of genre 
 
The brief outline I have given of the history, structure and use of law reports will have 
offered nothing new to the ‘ordinary reader’ of such reports (i.e. a legal practitioner 
wishing to cite them in advancing a case, or a law student seeking to understand how 
cases function alongside statute to clarify the law, and in some circumstances extend it). 
In interdisciplinary work combining law with expectations of a different field, on the 
other hand (in this case the field of literary study), such reading conventions may appear 
specialised, even slightly alien. In law reporting it can be expected that genre conventions 
‘beyond the page’ will be activated when a report is consulted. In a law and literature 
forum, on the other hand, established strategies for interpreting cases appear less certain, 
even up for grabs. Instead of being adhered to, ‘norm-based’ interpretive procedures 
associated with law reports may be open to interrogation and challenge -- or simply 
ignored.  
 
How far, in such circumstances, are meaningful reading strategies limited to those which 
take account of procedural expectations associated with the conventions of a document 
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‘on the page’?  Exploring this question calls for clarification of how the genre of a 
document serves as a guide to meaning.  
 
Mostly, genre (of any kind, not only law reports) is described in terms of formal features, 
especially the conventional structures which are used to construct a complete text within 
the given genre. Such structures are typically manifest in one-off features that direct the 
text along a given path so that it achieves its intended purpose through a series of steps or 
moves; the headings, layout of sections, and progression through different topics 
culminating in a verdict or decision are genre features of a law report in this sense. Genre 
features of this structural kind co-occur with other markers, of linguistic register, which 
show continuous selection between alternative forms that have different connotations but 
might in other respects communicate the same meaning.
28
 In addition, this combination 
of structural and register features links with genre characteristics at another level: that of 
audience expectations brought to bear on a text which exhibits such formal features: what 
the text is likely to be about, how seriously it should be taken, in many cases what kind of 
pleasure or insight it will offer. There appear, therefore, to be genre-defining features at 
two levels: a level of linguistic expression; and a level of what might be called inferential 
modelling, or ‘ways of reading’.  
 
In conjunction with these two levels, however, a third, strategic level of interpretation is 
also important: that of the action-orientation of the interpreter, or practice in which the 
interpreter is engaged (arguably a different way of describing Posner’s wider concept of 
‘purpose’). At this level, to extend the term ‘interpretive community’ used by Fish to 
indicate social groups of interpreters who follow common interpretive strategies,
29
 
readers are members of groupings or ‘communities’ not only in terms of overlapping 
meanings they are likely to assign but also in sharing a disposition to behave, on reading 
and interpreting a text, in a particular way (often by performing a text-oriented 
professional task or duty). Meaning for a lawyer, viewed in this way, is not only unlikely 
to be the same as for a literary critic; it is also likely to have a different significance in its 
connection with social action. 
 
A ‘community of practice’ of this kind (e.g. a community organised around common 
priorities of a profession, such as lawyers or literary critics) is something more than an 
interpretive community in a purely ‘meaning attributing’ sense.30 What makes it 
something more is the shift of perspective, signified by the term ‘practice’, from 
entertaining meanings as cognitive or affective representations to using meanings as a 
basis for some specialised social or professional conduct.  
 
Interpretive practice, however, like other kinds of social practice, varies and changes. 
When a new or different interpretive community brings to bear interpretive strategies in 
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attributing meaning to a text that differ from those anticipated in the text’s composition, a 
range of new, ‘unprecedented’ meanings and kinds of significance are likely to be 
ascribed.  
 
The interest and value of such new meanings is properly subject to query and 
contestation. Posner's response to the question of how far license should extend in 
interpreting legal discourse in alternative ways has been that ‘literary’ approaches neglect 
crucial considerations of legal purpose. His test case for this view was that of statutes and 
constitutions, which, read in a different way, no longer function ‘legally’, as defining, 
normative documents. With law reports, following the same reasoning, if a report is 
removed from its legal moorings then a re-reading of it will similarly fail to recognise the 
relevant sense of legal purpose. This analogy may be imperfect, however. If a text such as 
a law report is reinterpreted beyond its customary discourse setting it takes on an 
interpretive purpose associated with its new setting as well as losing the settled meanings 
of the interpretive context from which it was taken. What is significant is then not so 
much what is lost but whether something of value is gained. In Fish’s celebrated 
classroom anecdote of his students who thought the names of 1970s stylisticians on a 
blackboard were a religious poem, for example, the second class of students were not just 
‘not stylistics’ students but something else: they were would-be interpreters learning how 
meanings are created from linguistic cues in religious poetry.
31
  
 
Law reports, we have seen, follow genre conventions that are normative, embedded in the 
institutional functioning of law as well as in textual features. To this extent, law reports 
resemble Posner's statutes and constitutions. But legal cases serve purposes that directive 
statements do not. They narrate events in a world beyond the courts, in ways that 
resemble historical narrative and literary writing, especially realist fiction. There are 
characters, actions and motives drawn from life, overlaid with a fabric of themes, moral 
contrasts and kinds of significance. Composition of law reports mediates between the 
referential world of lived experience that can be seen from multiple points of view and a 
set of imposed categories of legal reasoning, in ways that differ fundamentally from the 
rereading of statutes or constitutions. So while it may not be easy to see the purpose of 
literary re-interpretation of the performative language of a statute or constitution, there 
may still be value in re-interpreting ‘cases’, whose narration creates legal and moral 
contrasts that lead towards judgments based on discourse in court but also have 
potentially life-changing implications in the extra-discursive world beyond the court. 
 
What makes re-interpretations of cases significant is still a question of purpose, as Posner 
suggests. What can give value to such new readings, however, is how they revisit facts 
and circumstances with additional, contextual depth or insight (drawing attention to 
‘silent’ or ‘neglected’ facts), or how they adopt a fresh perspective (opening up some 
previously unexplored line of reasoning or teasing out a subtext or hidden meaning). 
Apparent priorities in the original treatment of a case may be juxtaposed with competing 
values possibly only touched on in the margins of the proceedings themselves. Such 
reading is not the stuff of a traditional legal hypothetical, asking whether the case would 
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have been decided differently in a different set of circumstances or at a different date. 
Subjected to suitable literary re-reading, legal issues may be connected to wider questions 
of ethics, social attitude, or change during the period in which the proceedings took place. 
Readings along such lines also have scope to reinstate material left out-of-frame when the 
complex texture of a given social experience was funnelled into a cause of legal action 
and the proceedings that followed.  
 
Understanding inference and rhetoric  
 
Many of the interpretive techniques deployed in such re-readings have affinities with, and 
in some cases are directly derived from, specialised kinds of interpretive work developed 
for reading novels, plays and films (as well as other kinds of textual analysis, including in 
religious scholarship). Such strategies and methods have been examined in great detail 
by, among others, the film scholar David Bordwell in his analysis of an ‘industry’ of 
interpretation in the humanities.
32
 Bordwell shows how interpreting involves not only 
problem-solving but also rhetorical expertise, features notably shared with law. At the 
same time interpretation is also, Bordwell shows, a conventional and to some extent 
formulaic social activity. To illustrate this conventional aspect, Bordwell identifies and 
illustrates a series of typical stages in interpreting or re-interpreting a text: explicating 
what is directly said; selectively assigning general semantic fields, by picking out details 
and elevating them into contrasts from which more general themes are derived; forming 
interpretive hypotheses (for instance by assuming that the text will show unity, or will 
leave its core message unsaid, or will be ironic or exaggerated), then mapping the chosen 
semantic fields onto the selected hypothesis by means of schemata (which supply 
evidence, possibly using metaphors and puns to strengthen relevant links); finally, 
presenting the interpretation in a chosen rhetorical genre, as some form of proof, 
exemplification of a theory, or moral parable.  
 
The techniques of analysis and persuasion examined in Bordwell’s study are recognisable 
across a range of interpretive fields. What is most striking about them in this context is 
how they cut across the conventional division between literary criticism and the legal 
discourse of reported ‘cases’. There is no need to illustrate here the many kinds of 
insightful work that can result. Other chapters in this book amply illustrate the richness of 
comment and critique that can be achieved. Unfolding in the course of such readings, 
however, is also a further level of insight: into how textual interpretation is made possible 
by processes of attributing significance to complex kinds of narrative and expository 
linguistic evidence, from different points of view and for different purposes. 
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Conclusion 
 
Both ‘case’ and ‘report’, I have suggested, are ordinary words whose polysemy 
complicates interdisciplinary study, while passing largely unnoticed. Exploiting such 
polysemy, in order to produce insightful, interdisciplinary readings of legal cases, opens 
up new and potentially important responses to legal topics and themes. But what quickly 
becomes evident in such work is that ‘reading’ and ‘interpretation’ are similarly complex 
words and concepts.
33
 Whereas ‘case’ and ‘report’ are words whose polysemy might be 
viewed as somehow incidental, however, ‘reading’ and ‘interpretation’ are foundational 
terms of art in both literature and law. As with other terms of art, these words call for 
analysis of the different meanings they can reasonably bear in different contexts, as well 
as analysis of why other meanings for them appear strained or extraneous. To strengthen 
understanding of how such terms function in law and literature, and to what effect, 
reflexiveness and critical interrogation is required of a kind that Posner considered -- 
perhaps oddly, given the centrality of skills of construction in law -- merely unlikely to 
contribute to legal understanding.  
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